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elsewhere, the Teacher says: "Sacrifice or worship (*yajna*), alms-giving, and disciplinary austerities (*tapas*) are not to be given up, but performed, for they are sanctifying to the wise" (XVIII, 5). In the fifth chapter he had already said: "By the body, the mind, the intellect, the senses, and the organs purified, the *yogins* do their work, giving up attachment, for the purification of the self" (V. 11). Thus the final end of duty was seen, and work, even when related to the smallest ends, ceased to be either unholy or useless. When all duties were seen to be ultimately related to the final end of life, each of them, however trifling in itself, was found to have a place allotted to it in the grand scheme of life and to have lost its insignificance. Even the so-called lower desires, which we are first enjoined to eschew, have their respective claims recognized when they are seen to be subsidiary to the fulfillment of the highest desire of life,—desire for perfection. Thus we find Krishna ever and anon speaking of earthly objects not as things to be abjured altogether, but as objects to be enjoyed with a purified heart unattached to such objects. It is thus that the *Gita* transforms the abstract legalism of earlier thinkers into an idealistic scheme of life in which both the absoluteness of the moral law and the relative importance of the concrete affairs of life find due recognition and reconciliation.

CALCUTTA.

SITANATH TATTVABHUSHAN.

## MORALITY AS INTER-PERSONAL.

E. W. HIRST.

THE following essay is intended to be, first of all, a criticism of the usual view of ethics as being too 'individualistic' in a sense of the term which it is hoped will become clear as the discussion proceeds; secondly, it is a plea that morality is no form of merely unipersonal activity, but is rather an inter-personal relationship.

At the outset we may perhaps be allowed to take for granted that 'good' has a relation to consciousness more or less direct, that ultimately it is some form of desirable conscious life. It is true that Moore ("Principia Ethica," ch. III, p. 50) thinks it would be a duty to seek to bring about a beautiful rather than an ugly world, even though no human being could by any possibility ever contemplate such beauty. But, surely, the very suggestion that a world can be 'beautiful' in itself stands in need of some justification. Such a world cannot even be referred to, save by language which embodies the ideas of a human consciousness. And it seems to us that, when we try to think of a world beautiful in itself, we can do so only as we imagine it contemplated by a consciousness either human or divine; and that we can call such a world 'good' only as we consider it in relation to a consciousness that either produces or appreciates it.

Of course, all that we call 'good' has not the same relation to human consciousness. Mr. Moore himself points out that 'good' may mean either that which is good in itself or that which is merely good as means to the production of what is good in itself. When we call a book or a house 'good,' we certainly do not mean that either of these things is an end in itself. There are many things we call 'good' in the sense either that they are means to what is good or that they are capable of relation to a whole which is valuable in itself. But it does not appear that there can be more than one thing good in itself. Our very nature as reasonable agents constrains us to unify our activity by connecting whatever proximate ends we pursue with some ultimate end or 'end in itself.' Two things declared 'good in themselves' would require to be brought into relation, and, in order to do this, either the one would need to be made subservient to the other, or both to some 'good' really final or absolute. Even 'personal affection' and 'æsthetic enjoyment,' which Mr. Moore considers to be the things intrinsically valuable, will continually call for a mutual adjustment of their

claims. Or if, in other words, 'good' is regarded as that which satisfies desire, desires are never atomic and unrelated. They are always the desires of an intelligent consciousness and therefore they are given some sort of order or system. The expression 'master-passion' corresponds to reality.

Professor Royce, in his "Philosophy of Loyalty," identifies 'good' with loyalty to a 'cause.' But there does not appear to be anything ultimate in the 'cause' which is served, for example, by a light-house keeper, a watch-maker, or a domestic servant. A light-house keeper's 'cause' is good in so far as it safeguards sailors and merchandise. But this only raises the question as to the ultimate purpose of merchandise and indeed of human life.

We hope, however, at a later stage of the discussion, to make more clear the precise relation between the good which is good in itself and good which is good only as means or by incorporation.

Taking it for granted, then, that 'goodness' is some form of desirable conscious life, we find that most moralists have regarded that conscious life as belonging to the mere individual, considered in abstraction and insulated from his fellows. The treatment of the ethical problem has been further artificial and unreal in that this insulated consciousness of the individual has been, as it were mechanically, taken to pieces. Abstraction has been made of some one element of consciousness, such as that of feeling, knowing, or willing, and goodness has been identified with the perfection of such element.

There is no need to refer at length to those moralists who, making abstraction of the affective aspect of consciousness, have identified ultimate good with pleasure. The defects of this view have so often been pointed out that nothing in the way of criticism will be attempted here. Other moralists, making abstraction of the cognitive aspect of consciousness, have identified morality with a way of knowing. In English ethics we have inter-

esting examples of this type in Wollaston and Clarke. But our consciousness of ethical value is certainly not a mere matter of cognition. It may be expressed in a judgment, but the judgment is not therefore creative of the value. No number of judgments could ever convey the idea of goodness to an intelligence devoid of moral consciousness. "It is one thing for an object to have a meaning for thought, *i. e.*, significance, but another thing to have a meaning for experience, *i. e.*, value." "Value is never a character or quality of an object, but always a relation between an object and a subject."<sup>1</sup> "Predicates are *what* we feel about the object, not *how* we feel. We feel beauty, goodness, nobility, sublimity, obligation, but when we describe how we feel, in such cases a transition has been made to the appreciative description of the feeling itself."<sup>2</sup>

Very influential has been a third school of thinkers who, abstracting from consciousness the element of will, look upon conduct too much as a matter of separate and unrelated volitions. Morality is accordingly supposed to reside in actions, whether these be regarded in their overt aspect as deeds, or on their inner side as intentions. From such a point of view, man becomes simply a doer of deeds. Butler, for instance, teaches that human nature is made up of 'principles of action,' an expression to be interpreted as implying that there are within us 'settled ways of acting.' These 'principles of action' are further distinguished as being some of them good and some bad. In fact, human nature is represented as containing a hierarchy of impulses, and the language used is of 'superior and inferior' principles of action, or of 'higher and lower' parts of the nature. Martineau also has a similar doctrine. "We are sensible," he says, "of a contrast between impulses other than that of mere intensity or of qualitative variety . . . that one is higher, worthier,

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<sup>1</sup> J. L. McIntyre, *Proceedings of Aristotelian Soc.*, N. S., Vol. 5.

<sup>2</sup> W. M. Urban, "Valuation, Its Nature and Laws," p. 56.

than the other, and, in comparison with it, has the clear right to us." Again, "we are sensible of a graduated scale of excellence among our natural principles."<sup>3</sup> It should be borne in mind that these so-called 'springs of action' are indeed 'actions'; they are unreflecting instincts which impel to their appropriate objects, or impulses supervening on experience and whose preconceived end is the object of a primary impulse.

To say only one brief word of criticism, the supreme difficulty of all such views is of course that, if impulses differ in rank, if some are good and some are bad or even less good, nothing can ever make such bad impulse good, or quite acquit of moral compromise anyone who acts from an impulse of inferior value. The truth is that appetites, passions, and affections, when considered merely as 'parts' of human nature, are in themselves neither right nor wrong. They are, of course, ethically indifferent: they are unmoral. Butler never succeeds in clearly showing what it is that makes the exercise of any impulse right or wrong. All he says is practically this: If you act in one way, you are right; if in another way, you are wrong. Conduct is regarded too much as an affair of deeds or isolated intentions, and for its regulation is supposed to require just 'principles of action.' Accordingly, the honest, the pure, the benevolent are such because they manifest a traditional form of behavior. Doubtless there is an important sense in which we may speak of honest, pure or benevolent 'acts,' but, for our part, we cannot regard goodness as expressible in terms of mere deeds and impulses, or of rules and principles of action. Certainly, such rules or principles have their place, embodying as they do the results of individual and racial experience. But when once reflection is brought to bear on all such 'principles of conduct,' their inadequacy as real principles is easily seen. Henry Sidgwick has clearly shown that these so-called moral axioms lack

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<sup>3</sup>"Types of Ethical Theory," Part 2, Bk. 1, ch. 1, Par. 2.

self-evidence and self-sufficiency: they are not all equally fundamental or independent. One illustration only need be given. Let it be that of veracity, which Butler in his "Dissertation" declared to be (along with justice and the common good) 'virtue.' That we should speak truth might well be regarded as axiomatic. Yet many hold it right to deceive,—in such cases as those where the deception will be for the benefit of the person 'deceived.' People do not hesitate to speak 'falsely' to invalids and children. All acknowledge the wisdom of limiting, according to circumstances, the amount of knowledge to be imparted. We speak the truth, therefore, not so much because it is right to do so, for there need be no inherent virtue merely in the accurate stating of an occurrence. There is, to be sure, accuracy and accuracy. There may be a correctness of statement which is falser than inaccuracy. All depends on the use which one wishes to make of what one is telling, and it is instructive to note that, according to variation of motive, a statement is given with added comments, or allowed to pass with the minimum of detail, or uttered with reservations so important as to render the report in its bareness misleading. A lie is not so much an inaccurate statement as it is a statement of which the object is to use another person as a means to purposes purely selfish. No one can tell the truth to another save as he reverences the other's personality. We regard quite differently the inaccuracy which results from bad memory or defective observation. What we condemn is an egoistic use of the medium by which thought is communicated. In this sense truth is made for man, and not man for truth. And what is especially significant for our purpose is that two or more persons are necessary ere truth can be told.

Not only do we see therefore that morality cannot be identified with the exercise (if that were possible) of any particular aspect of consciousness, but we are securing evidence that consciousness itself, when it is regarded as that of the individual considered in abstraction, cannot

possess ethical quality. The single self cannot be moral. We have just seen that veracity implies inter-activity between persons. That benevolence does so needs no proof. Self-love, too, would have no meaning except as it implies a social situation in the background. As for 'the several passions and affections,' Butler admits that even those which tend most immediately to respect self tend, however, to the public good as well. But a thorough discussion of the relations of self-love and benevolence and of the passions as capable of organization by a supreme principle is wanting in Butler. He wavers as to the relative position of self-love and benevolence. But it is significant that in Sermon XII he considers benevolence regarded as a reasonable principle (rather than a natural affection) as superior to 'conscience.' He speaks of it as 'the temper of virtue,' and points out that "the common virtues and the common vices of mankind may be traced up to benevolence, or the want of it." And though in the "Dissertation on the Nature of Virtue," published ten years later than the Sermons, he apparently contradicts this statement, yet it is to be remembered that in the "Dissertation," benevolence means simply a 'disposition to make happy,' whereas in Sermon XII it is rather 'good-will' of which the object is 'the greatest public good.'

If Martineau be taken, it requires little penetration to see how unescapable is the social reference of his 'springs of action.' With regard to 'antipathy, fear, and anger,' he himself confesses that "in a world without persons, they would fail of their proper idea and identity." Again, love of pleasure, of money, of power, not to speak of further items in the list, clearly have a very vital relation to our positions as social beings.

The indication of all this is that a good individual, in vacuo so to speak, is an impossibility. The individual cannot be moral in the same sense in which he can be clever or happy. He is of course an agent, and in that sense morality is something which the individual must practise. But to practise his morality, he must at once



go out of himself. As soon as he deliberates what he ought to do, he finds that all his actions have both social references and social consequences. If he is to be anything, he is to be something in relation to others. He is a self in a world of selves. The supreme ethical question, therefore, is the attitude he shall assume to the selves by whom he is surrounded.

Now it seems to us true in the abstract that there can be no expression of the self as a whole save to other selves. I can come into relationship with a thing only in virtue of my being in space. As I am much more than a 'thing,' I cannot possibly express myself other than partially to a 'thing.' A man needs beings like to himself if he would manifest himself in all his fullness: a person can express personality only to persons.

Further, there is growing evidence derived from social psychology as to the inter-relationship of mind with mind. The phenomena of the single mind simply cannot be understood unless we take account of the social factor. At the very dawn of intelligent life there seems in the infant an instinctive tendency to react upon a social environment represented by the mother or nurse. As it has been said, the 'ego' and the 'alter' are born together in child experience. "Bashfulness, shame, jealousy, are some of the more fundamental tendencies rooted in the organic structure of the human babe, which seem to reveal ancestral conditions of collective life and habit."<sup>4</sup> The growth of the sense of self acts and reacts upon the growth of the sense of other selves. "The social relation is in all cases intrinsic to the life, interests, and purposes of the individual." A few examples will show how true this is. The development of intelligence is throughout dependent upon the social factor. Our 'world' is to a large extent made over to us by others through the medium of language. We continue to believe in an objective realm because such belief receives con-

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<sup>4</sup> Mark Baldwin, "The Individual and Society," p. 19.

stant social verification. Unless we were sure that other people would pronounce the same verdict, we should not usually call anything a 'fact.' Likewise emotional experiences cannot be fully explained except as we consider minds in relation. The physical organs of reproduction, implying as they do more than the individual's body, are accompanied by a characteristic mental equipment which finds its explanation in the appropriate impulses and feelings of another of different sex. The phenomena of vanity and guilty fear are unintelligible if account be taken of the private consciousness alone. Objects of ambition would have their value much modified, if not destroyed, were the social environment conceived as being absent. The actions we conventionally regard as right or wrong are so considered largely owing to the influence of the opinions or traditions of the community. If, as McDougall contends, the instincts are directly or indirectly the prime movers of all human activity, and if they are the survivals of those ways of acting which animals adopted for the preservation of their kind, then it is easy to see in this case also how the instincts of flight, curiosity, pugnacity, self-display, self-abasement, and the parental instinct lend support to the thesis that the activity of men, as of animals, is really 'inter-activity.'

There follows immediately an important consequence for ethics. Since a self is not active except as among other selves, morality, being some attitude of the self as a whole, must be inter-personal. There can therefore be no duties that are strictly speaking 'self-regarding.' Not that prudence and self-culture cease to be obligatory. Rather are one's powers to be developed and exercised on account of their social value.

It is now time to try to determine that form of inter-activity between selves which is 'ethical.' What precisely must be the attitude of an 'I' to a 'thou.' Many forms of inter-relationship call for a brief preliminary examination. By a study of the actual instances of coherence which life shows to us we shall best find out the coherence

that is moral. Whatever form of activity we decide to be morally valid must have its psychical antecedents. The ethical mode of action must be psychically possible, and as such must have a relationship to those other modes by which men inter-act.

There is disagreement among psychologists as to the beginnings of sociality. Professor Baldwin holds that "actual life together of creatures having the tendency to imitative reaction, results inevitably in sympathy and sociality. . . . Self-thoughts imitatively organized are, I contend, the essence of what is social."<sup>5</sup> Others think the greater factor is not so much imitation as sympathy.<sup>6</sup> There is, however, an ambiguous use of the term 'sympathy' which must be guarded against. There is a sense in which it refers merely to the tendency of animals or persons to feel 'like' their neighbors, *e. g.*, to take on the same moods. Such 'sympathy' is of the nature of imitation, though the latter term is usually restricted to the assimilation of bodily movements rather than to the sympathetic induction of feeling. There are many illustrations of this hard, ethically neutral sympathy which is by some called 'organic,' by others, 'primitive.' It is an instinctive reflex. It is shown by the infant in responding to the smiles or frowns of others; it is shown by dogs when they howl at the distresses of their master or their fellow-dogs. One of the commonest examples is the spread of fear and its flight-impulse among the members of a flock or herd. "Sympathy of this crude kind is the cement that binds animal societies together, renders the actions of all members of a group harmonious, and allows them to reap some of the prime advantages of social life in spite of lack of intelligence."

But it is one thing to feel 'like' others; it is quite another thing to feel 'for' others. It does not seem possible that the latter should be evolved from the former. To feel 'for' others is to put a bridge across the gulf which

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<sup>5</sup> "Social and Ethical Interpretations," pp. 574, 575.

<sup>6</sup> McDougall, "Social Psych.," p. 91 *sq.*

yawns between two lives. No reproduction or reflection of another's experiences seems in itself capable of bringing about any approximation. Accordingly, many psychologists turn to the maternal feelings as the ultimate source of tender emotion or of sympathy in the popular sense of that term as a 'feeling for.' In the devotion of the mother to her offspring is found the beginning of every kind of altruistic conduct. Höffding suggests ("Outlines of Psychology," ch. VI) that as the child before birth forms with the mother a vital whole, sympathy appears as growing out of self-preservation. It will be sufficient, however, to note how mother and child are interlocked as separate lives. The mother's primary impulse is to afford physical protection to the child by throwing her arms about it. The strength of this instinct in animals and man is probably owing to the activity of natural selection which weeds out the feeble offspring of a badly mothered race and brings about the survival of the well-mothered. It is suggested that in human beings there takes place a vast extension of the field of application of the maternal instinct. Anything weak or defenceless tends by the operation of the law of association to rouse the instinct to cherish. Intelligence and imagination cannot fail to have some effect in widening and extending the scope of the operation of this impulse to cherish. Accordingly, it is to this instinct, existing first in the female, but shared later in different degrees by all, that many ascribe all agitation on behalf of the sick, the poor, the enslaved, and all labor for social reform.

Granting, then, that maternal affection is a stage through which other types of love must pass, we must carefully note the points of difference between it and the love that is ethical. We do not imply that there is any rigid dualism as between the 'instinctive' and the 'ethical,' for a human instinct extended and worked over by the intelligence is incorporated into the activity of that whole we call consciousness, however widely we may afterwards have to conceive that whole. But ethical activity cannot

depend upon an excitant of that specific, predetermined kind, which we associate with an instinct. And, clearly, maternal affection is automatic and largely independent of the will. In some mothers it is found to be nearly wanting, in which case they are denounced as 'unnatural.' Where it is very strong, it is often accompanied by modes of behavior which the moral consciousness of the community would condemn. Such lapses are contrasted with devotion to offspring as being the one redeeming feature saving from utter disorganization of life. Maternal love further gives evidence of its instinctive character by its narrowness of range. It exhausts itself in a specific object,—the mother loves her own child. She may do this at the same time that she maintains an attitude of indifference or even of hostility to the children of others. Sometimes domestic love can become quite insular and love for one's own family even anti-social. The literature of 'wills' and bequests often supplies evidence of an interpretation of the interests of family which is out of all relation to the interests of city or country. Perhaps one of the most needed of reforms is the complete ethicizing of domestic life in its relation to society and the race.

Group life also need not imply more than the operation of instinct. The tendency of animals and men to herd together in flocks and tribes has been a useful instrument of evolution. But the instinctive nature of these human attachments is clearly shown by the fact that they do not prevent the members of one class, tribe or nation from indulging in the most violent hatred towards, or waging the most terrible conflicts with, members of other classes, tribes, or nations. Nor is the coöperation which obtains in modern industrial, civic, and national life really moral. Men live and work with, rather than for, one another. Much of this combination, being little more than intelligent egoism, is ever liable to be interfered with by strikes, lock-outs, class prejudice and legislation. As Rudolph Eucken says: "All combination and coöperation in work

cannot prevent a wide divergence, a rampant selfishness, an inward isolation of the individual.”<sup>7</sup>

Regarding philanthropy as a form of the maternal instinct, we do not even here get rid of that automatism and narrowness of range aforementioned. There seems little principle in the way in which people select the causes they will agitate and suffer for. To some needs the philanthropist heartily responds; to other kinds of need he is strangely cold. And these vagaries are quite consistent with the activity of an instinct as dependent upon a specific excitant. Some men are provoked to relieve merely hunger; others are stirred by slavery; yet others by political injustice. The causes of charity are legion and the selection of any one of these seems often quite arbitrary. What is still more striking is that ardor in one cause can and often does co-exist with a strange coolness for other equally or more deserving causes. Moreover the reformer's aim is often quite immediate and concrete; many labor to make a nation sober with little or no reflection on the ulterior purposes of sobriety. Social work is sometimes divorced from a ‘working faith.’

And as to philanthropy in general, the bestowment of physical ‘good’ on another may be prompted by the desire merely to provide others with the means of greater happiness. That this is good as far as it goes we do not wish to deny. But if this beneficence be regarded as exhaustive of the ethical responsibility of one man to another, we demur. We have already rejected the view that the ultimate good is happiness. Therefore to regard my neighbor as merely the subject of happiness is to offer an affront to his nature. He is more than a creature of feeling,—he is a self,—a person. As a matter of fact, there is much philanthropy which actually tends to encourage an unhealthy and unethical social condition. For if one section of society are ‘givers’ and another ‘receiv-

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<sup>7</sup>“Life of the Spirit,” Eng. Trans., by Pogson, p. 92.

ers,' a sense of superiority is easily begotten in the former, of weakness and inferiority in the latter.

But a true 'philanthropy,'—that love of man which is ethical,—will seek for others a 'good' which one judges to be highest for oneself. It will be accepted as a formal criterion of ethical good that it must be capable of being universalized. The good for one is the good for others. Therefore if 'love' be the good, all men are called to be 'lovers,' and in so far as 'love' and 'gifts' are associated, all men ought to be 'givers,' each having something to give. In other words, man must be drawn to man as man. Instinct, however developed, seems of itself inadequate to do this. It may do much to attach man to his fellow when helpless, poor, hungry, enslaved, or diseased. But the impulses of pity and compassion act too mechanically, too arbitrarily, and too externally. For it is to treat the self-hood of another in far too external a fashion if we are concerned merely to safeguard his health of body, his liberty as a subject, his freedom as a citizen. Man is more than body, than feeling, than intelligence,—he is a self, a person. So that the ethical question is the quite general one of the relationship of man to man as such. The ultimate inquiry is as to their attitude as persons. Is it one of repulsion or attraction? If it is one of attraction, we may call this union of selves love. Such love is essentially voluntary and truly universal in scope. Those instincts and impulses which bind man to his fellow lead up to this love. But as the roots of the former are in man's physical nature, and the latter is by contrast spiritual, transcendent of merely natural impulses in being thus voluntary and universal, we have here no case of evolution as ordinarily conceived. Love may evolve through instincts without being evolved by them. To trace it back to maternal affection is to find only its psychological antecedents. And we part company from all those writers who regard the origin and history of an experience as tantamount to an explanation of it. Love is of such a nature as not only to require a history, but

also to present a challenge and set a problem. It actually calls for an explanation. And to solve the phenomena of ethical love we need, to use a Euckenian term, a no-ology rather than a psychology. We cannot here go further into the matter, but the newer views of evolution offer some help. At every stage of development Bergson finds the presence of a creative impulse which is perpetually adding something to life which was not already there. It may be, however, that the contrast between matter and spirit should be, as with Eucken, somewhat sharper, and that love is the product of an 'independent spiritual life.'

Now this coherence of selves is life's consummate achievement. It is an experience unique in its nature; it cannot be ranged under a higher genus; for its true appreciation it must be felt. We can, however, identify the experience by means of more or less adequate description. When we say that the moral relationship of A. to B. is one of 'love,' we mean that each retains his separateness as an individual agent, but parts with any separateness of 'interest.' To lose separateness of interest is to cease to have any aim for self from which we exclude another. Individuals may and will differ as to their proximate aims. But such differences will only make the ultimate oneness of aim illustrative of a richer and fuller harmony. It is in respect of qualities of mind or body, and with regard to circumstances, that differences between A. and B. obtrude themselves. But it is not these differences in themselves that tend most to bring about disunity. That which really keeps individuals apart is self-centeredness of aim. If A. and B. respectively revolve in an ego-centric orbit, they will move in different planes and a point of coördination can never be ensured.

We maintain that love effects the unification of A. and B., for love knows no separateness of 'interest' as between the two. But we must be clear that love is its own object. Butler said "every good affection implies



the love of itself." Therefore when A. loves B., he does not seek only, or even primarily, to bestow on B. any form of external good which B. and B. alone can use. Such a proceeding would tend to create in A. a sense of superior power working by pity and, in B.'s case, to magnify the importance of possessions in such wise as would obtrude the point of view of the happiness of the mere individual and interpret the 'interest' of B. in a purely proprietary and private sense. So long as the object of love is regarded as being only the happiness of another, we have not transcended the sphere of instinct or sentiment. When A. loves B. in the ideal, ethical way, he strives to establish as between the two one 'will' or 'heart.' And though A. alone may 'love' in point of fact, yet the relationship is complete when B. also aims to create and develop love in A. The relationship would, from the moral point of view, not be changed one iota by the substitution of Q. and X. for A. and B.

How love of love is possible may be made clear by a consideration of the various processes of *Einfühlung*. According to Professor W. M. Urban ("Valuation: Its Nature and Laws"), *Einfühlung*, which is at first intuitive, later becomes conceptual. In 'common feeling,' as it occurs in organic sympathy we 'think experiences in' intuitively. No distinction is made between feeling as felt and feeling as projected. But later "when the subject explicitly assumes the existence of the feeling in the *alter* and its necessary presuppositions, it can only be 'ejected' as a conceptual construction. The 'feeling-in' of an attitude into another, with the assumption of presuppositions different from those of one's own feeling, gives to the feeling a quasi-general meaning, a schematic character, which raises it out of the sphere of simple subjective appreciation, and starts it upon a new path of objective meaning" (p. 246). This 'schematic' character of the feeling abstracted from individual presuppositions permits of its being read to and fro from the *ego* to the *alter* in terms of idea.

In favor of 'love of love' as an ethical ideal we find an interesting statement in chapter XIV of the "Data of Ethics," where Spencer remarks that the highest altruism is that which ministers not to the egoistic satisfactions of others only, but also to their altruistic satisfactions. We may add to this a significant statement by Moore: "It is true that the most valuable appreciation of persons appears to be that which consists in the appreciation of their appreciation of other persons" ("Prin. Ethica," p. 204). A similar view is expressed in the "Philosophy of Loyalty" by Professor Royce, who, regarding loyalty to a cause as the supreme business of men, finally enunciates his principle thus: "In so far as it lies in your power, so choose your cause and so serve it, that, by reason of your choice and of your service, there shall be more loyalty in the world rather than less. And, in fact, so choose and serve your individual cause as to secure thereby the greatest possible increase of loyalty amongst men. More briefly: in choosing and in serving the cause to which you are to be loyal, be, in any case, loyal to loyalty" (p. 121). Again "Loyalty is a good for all men. And it is in any man just as much a true good as my loyalty could be in me."

We must now address ourselves to the question of the relation between morality and its content so-called. It will be asked how our view affects that relation. Our reply is in the nature of a paradox,—that goodness has no content. We mean that there are no deeds, thoughts, or volitions which are inherently right. It is not without significance that when the different schools of moralists turn from the exposition of their antagonistic principles to a discussion of rules for practice, antagonism seems almost to cease. The utilitarian will take over the moral code of the intuitionist. The Hegelian moralist, so far from actually extracting the content of conduct from any abstract consideration of an ideal like self-realization, obtains that content by reference to the concrete conditions under which life is found to be lived. And these con-

ditions are not inferred; they are simply observed. It looks as though, whatever our moral theories may be, men do and have to do in the world very much the same kind of things. Good and bad alike are engaged in doing much the same kind of things. The differences in their overt deeds are differences as to time, place, manner, and circumstances. But the mere deeds in themselves are inadequate criteria by which to discriminate the moral and immoral, the virtuous and vicious.

When we say, then, that 'love' has no content, do we mean that love alone is good? Far from it. There could be no such thing in this world as 'love alone' or love in vacuo. To begin with, there is no love apart from a lover. And when once we have said this, we have implied much besides. We have, in effect, in assuming lovers, postulated the existence of a number of human beings capable of inter-relation, and therefore living together in the same world, the world that we know. And in a world like ours man is not called upon to deliberate about the things he has to do. This is settled for him. He must eat and drink, be clad, and reproduce his kind, otherwise he cannot even be, let alone be a 'lover.' Indeed even before intelligence begins the reflective consideration of what modes of action this world requires, the main types of reaction on environment are determined for us by instincts. Hunger, thirst, nakedness, and sex bring into being in due course all the complexities of industry and the institutions of family, city and state. "It is impossible to draw any fixed line between the content of the moral good and of natural satisfaction." (Dewey and Tuft's "Ethics," p. 300.)

If, then, there can be no meaning in the statement that love alone is good, what is the precise relation of 'love' to those various forms of activity by which the 'lover' relates himself to his environment. We contend that love has intrinsic value; we have now to determine its relation to things which have not intrinsic value. We are not able to regard that relationship as one of end and means for

the reason that the 'means' is not a part of the good thing for the existence of which its existence is a necessary condition. As Moore puts it ("Prin. Ethica," p. 29), the necessity by which, if the good in question is to exist, the means to it must exist, is merely a natural or causal necessity. But in such a case it is clear that if the means can 'cause' the end, means and end must have a common nature to the extent of existing in the same sphere of reality. It is impossible for a physical means to 'cause' a spiritual good. Love, being, as we believe, the intrinsic good, nothing can be a means to love in the sense of being its 'cause.' Accordingly, we reject the relationship of 'end and means' and adopt that of 'whole and part.' We have already seen that love cannot exist except in a lover and his world. In other words, love which is the intrinsic good cannot exist save as it forms part of a wider whole. That which goes along with love to form this whole has not of itself intrinsic value, but since it forms part of a valuable whole it has a certain share in the value of that whole if only to the extent of making that value possible. That any form of activity in a world of time and space can become the vehicle of love gives it dignity on this account. But that which provides love with the possibility of its expression may exist by itself. Men may, and do, do the same things without love as they do with love. But these loveless activities cease to be quite the 'same,' inasmuch as they will lack the special spirit which otherwise informs them. That is to say, the 'whole' which is constituted by love's intermixing with life's ordinary activities differs from that whole made up of those activities alone, by being (1) wider, (2) of ethical quality.

In allowing that there is a part of our ethical whole which has no intrinsic value, we do not mean that the value of the whole must reside entirely in the other part, for, as we have seen, 'love alone' is an impossibility; love cannot be isolated or considered apart from the lover and his world. How exactly love can form with concrete

thoughts and deeds a 'whole' is not a problem specially ethical. It is but a particular example of the general problem of the relation between subject and object. As a matter of fact, life is always 'organized.' And whether the synthesis of spirit and nature is capable of a 'logical' explanation, or comes under the general category of 'action,' as with Eucken, is a matter somewhat outside the scope of this essay.

But it will be inquired whether there is any sort of guidance for practice furnished by the view of ethics here adopted. Granted that there are no deeds right in themselves, we may well expect that love will modify our deeds in respect to such matters as time, place, and circumstances of performance, frequency or infrequency of action together with abstention on occasion. We are not of course concerned now with the 'conscience' of any particular person or age. 'Conscience' in any particular man is a growth: it is largely the product of the community in which he lives and the deposit of racial experience. In the same way, men call many different things 'goods.' Any object satisfying a desire that is uniform and insistent gets singled out and called 'good.' But just as 'conscience' passes through stages of development, so there is a value-movement in reference to the things from time to time called 'good.' Though the 'values' of life continually vary in respect of emphasis and even often suffer inversion, yet generally speaking worth becomes transferred from some object of desire and feeling to the disposition which the worth attitude presupposes (Urban, "Valuation," p. 196). Objects of condition-worth are felt to be of less value than personal worths. They have more capacity for substitution and have less capacity for continuous valuation than personal worths (*ib.* p. 377). But as we have already seen, worthless objects may acquire 'complementary' value through relation to a valuable whole. Similarly 'conscience' has its history both in the individual and the race. It is an interesting inquiry how far moral laws, traditions, and practices as a

matter of history owe their origin to intelligence, and how far to emotion in the form of superstition.<sup>8</sup>

Leaving, however, these historical questions, we must recognize that there is a function which intelligence has to perform in relation to a moral value or end which itself it may be able neither to provide nor to validate. Intelligence may not be able to tell us what love is or that it is ethically supreme, but it may be expected to supply guidance as to how love should express itself in an intelligible world. Let us recall what we have considered to be the ideal ethical situation. Love is such a blending of persons as precludes any merely individual will. This experience, which is not purely cognitive or intellectual, is capable of reduction to intellectual terms. As thus reduced it becomes the Golden Rule and, expressed in the fuller and more precise rendering of Sidgwick, says: "It cannot be right for A. to treat B. in a manner in which it would be wrong for B. to treat A., merely on the ground that they are two different individuals and without there being any difference between the natures and circumstances of the two which can be stated as a reasonable ground for difference of treatment." Anyone who believes with us that the evil of the world proceeds rather from want of 'heart' than from want of 'thought' will attach much importance for practice to what may be criticized as a mere principle of impartiality. Such a principle forbids arbitrary inequality in the framing and administration of laws, and dictates that in the matter of the distribution of objects of desire men should be furnished as their needs or capacities require. Each man's aim should be to secure for love its most perfect expression in all possible kinds of mental and material excellence. Men as lovers should be given and should give whatever is needful for the richest and most complete development of their lives in the service of love. What kind of social and political action is necessary ere such

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<sup>8</sup> Cf. Farnell: "The Moral Service of the Intellect," *Hibbert Journal*, April, 1911.

an ideal could be realizable is a problem demanding the unbiassed exercise of intelligence. And when the hearts of men become really 'impartial' and the paramount interest is 'love,' such an 'interest' will not fail of its effect upon 'thought.' Imagination thus stimulated will be ever at work in criticism of custom and tradition; the natural sluggishness of intelligence will be quickened and the immobility of opinion disturbed. Freed from an egoistic bias, the mind will become open to the consideration of changes and will seek the way to such reconstruction of the various institutions of society as will provide love with its most suitable embodiment.

But it cannot be too strongly urged that social and economic changes of themselves would be without moral utility, save as they were used in the service of love. The 'goods' of life are but the tools of love. Equality of opportunity is of real value only as 'opportunity' is ethically interpreted and improved. Such equality may be called 'justice' and it is a state of things which government can help to bring about. But as it is 'a state of things,' it gives no guarantee of any permanent solution of the great human problem, because it cannot create among men that inner and spiritual union which is the real basis of inter-activity. Justice without love loses its rationale. We are aware that to give to all men equal consideration and to attribute to them an equal importance has been described as a 'Rational Benevolence' on the ground that all men may be considered as forming parts of a Mathematical Whole. And such a mode of reasoning exerts upon the mind the quasi-aesthetic effect of any neat presentation of a case in figures or symbols. But there is here an error due to the love of abstraction. We are not dealing with anything quite like the relative position of units in forming a numerical whole. The 'whole' which men are called upon to form is of a different sort, and the mode of formation is different. This 'whole' is formable by any two individuals. That other individuals may and do form the same sort of 'whole' is not at all com-

parable to the differences made in the size of a number according as it is made up of five or five thousand units. Of course, if five thousand people 'love' instead of five, there is a difference, but it is like the difference made when a family grows in size. As the number of those who are united together increases, the oneness of spirit and aim grows in strength of richness, and love becomes more complex in its organization.

Now it is sometimes said that true good does not admit of being competed for. So long as 'good' is identified with anything of an external nature, so that it is shareable in unequal amounts, it does seem to us that in this case competition can never be precluded. Moreover, when the 'good' is regarded as being something at the end of a series of actions, it is impossible to know that there will be no discrepancy as between the individual and the general interest. As soon as goodness is made a calculable matter, we can never be sure of it, either for ourselves or others. For example, it is impossible to say beforehand exactly how much 'pleasure' a certain course of action will bring either for oneself or for others. A reconciliation of interests can never be assured when you are at the mercy of issues and results. But the theory we advocate does not seek to prove coincidence of interests empirically. It begins with the coincidence rather than arrives at it, for it defines the individual's 'interest' as the act of love which transcends self and other in a union of wills. Such love is the guarantee of a 'justice' which becomes ever more perfect.

Into the metaphysical questions that suggest themselves we cannot enter. The ultimate rationale of 'love' appears to be connected with the view that finite selves are dependent upon a common ground alike for their existence and apparent independence as for the possibility of their interaction. We have passed in review many of the ways by which, as it were mechanically, men are drawn together. But their proper ethical union seems to require, not only a metaphysic for its justification, but also a re-



ligion for its effecting. Man draws his neighbor to a moral embrace of the purest and most lasting kind on his realization that they both form parts of the same great Whole; and aided, as we believe, by the energy wherewith the Whole sustains itself together with the parts. Love to man is at once ensured and transcended by reverence for God.

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## THE WOMAN-SOUL.

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THE motive forces animating those interested in Feminism are as various as the reasons which caused their interest to arise. But in general these supporters may be separated, with regard to their hopes or expectations concerning the womanhood of the future, into three main classes, two large and one small. In one class are those who believe that eventually men and women will possess the same capabilities, and exhibit identical mental and moral qualities. Many Americans are of this type, and the idea is the main thesis of "Sex Equality," by Emmot Densmore, M.D. The author says: "There is every reason to anticipate that in the full fruition of the race, each individual, male and female, will exhibit indifferently both masculine and feminine traits." This class claim that it is environment and sex-heredity that have caused the differences in the sexes; and as, in the future, woman's upbringing, education, and occupations approximate to man's, and man's moral qualities approximate to woman's, then the two sexes will differ only in physique, and even in regard to physical strength there will be less difference, owing to changes in the circumstances of each. Man, with the introduction of machinery, will need to use less and less muscular power, and with the elimination of war, will exercise less often the fierce elements of his nature; while woman,